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We report the results of an experiment on a continuous version of the 
minimum effort coordination game. The introduction of within-team 
competition significantly increases effort levels relative to a baseline with no 
competition and increases coordination relative to a secure treatment where 
the payoff-dominant equilibrium strategy weakly dominates all other 
actions. Nonetheless, within-team competition does not prevent subjects to 
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1 Introduction 
Economic interaction often requires a good deal of coordination among agents. In some 
settings, as for instance on the labor or product markets prices aggregate information and 
coordinate agents’ actions. However, in many settings coordination is only implicitly 
supported by nothing more than the belief that all agents will act in concert. Such belief-
based coordination is quite fragile, because even the uncertainty about the behavior of 
others can trigger coordination failure. Coordination failure can take the form of both non-
equilibrium outcome and coordination on an inefficient equilibrium. Examples of outcomes 
from coordination on an inefficient equilibrium range from under-provision of public goods 
to the selection of inefficient technologies or technological stagnation.  
  Coordination games have been associated to actual problems of firms and industries. 
Knez and Simester (2002) study the Continental Airlines case in the 90’s where 
interdependent groups of employees jointly determined the firm’s outcome in terms of time 
arrival, stressing the relevance of coordination in complex organizations. Ichniowski, Shaw, 
and Prennushi (1997) study steel plants to find that steel production takes place in an 
assembly line setting with productivity largely determined by unscheduled downtime. A 
poor performance by a single employee could largely tear down the efficiency of the entire 
line. Economic recessions, underdevelopment of poor countries and involuntary 
unemployment are other examples of coordination failures.  
Coordination problems are usually modelled as non-cooperative games with multiple 
Pareto-ranked equilibria. Several theoretical approaches to the study of coordination games 
address the issue of equilibrium selection. The traditional approach includes Harsanyi and 
Selten’s (1988) general theory of equilibrium selection and its concept of payoff- and risk-
dominance. Other approaches involve equilibrium analysis of perturbed games (Anderson, 
Goeree and Holt, 2001), rational learning models (Crawford, 1995, Crawford and Broseta, 
1998 and Broseta, 2000), and evolutionary dynamics (Crawford, 1991 and Kim, 1996).  
The experimental method provides an alternative approach to equilibrium selection 
problems. Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990, 1991, and 1993) designed coordination games 
with seven symmetric Pareto-ranked equilibria that were played by large groups repeatedly 
in the laboratory.
1 The payoffs of subjects were determined by their strategies called ‘efforts’ 
                                      
1 Experiments on coordination games have also considered the Stag Hunt game (Rakin, van Huyck and 
Battalio, 2000); the Battle of Sexes game (Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross, 1993 and Rapoport, 1997); and 
other settings. A survey over the literature is presented in Ochs (1995).  
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and an order statistic of their own and other subjects’ efforts. In van Huyck et al (1990) they 
report on the minimum effort game in which the minimum effort is the order statistic of 
interest.
 2 All subjects’ payoffs increase in the minimum effort and in the difference of their 
own effort and the minimum effort. Van Huyck et al conclude on the basis of seven 
independent observations that the selection of the payoff-dominant equilibrium is extremely 
unlikely as all their experiments converge quickly to the most inefficient equilibrium. 
Maintaining the experimental set-up of van Huyck et al (1990), van Huyck et al (1991) study 
the median effort game in which the median effort is the order statistic that determines 
subjects’ payoffs. Though obviously less strategic uncertainty arises in the medium game 
than in the minimum game, the payoff-dominant equilibrium was selected only once???. 
The striking pattern in the data of van Huyck et al. (1991) was that all experiment exhibited a 
path-dependence pattern. In all observations, strategies converged quickly to the 
equilibrium of the median effort determined in the first period. In van Huyck et al (1993) 
reported selection of the payoff-dominant equilibrium in all median-cum auction 
experiments, in which subjects bid at a pre-selection auction stage for the right to play the 
median game with the winners of the auction.
3 Several experimental studies on the 
minimum effort coordination game report on reduced coordination failure due to parameter 
changes. Reducing the number of players (Van Huyck et al, 1990 and Knez and Camerer, 
1997), money back guarantees (Van Huyck et al, 1990), entry fees (Cachon and Camerer, 
1996), sequential rather than simultaneous play (Camerer, Knez and Weber, 1996), increased 
number of repetitions (Berninghaus and Erhard, 1998), pre-play communication 
(Riechmann and Weimann, 2004), and between group competiton (Bornstein, Gneezy and 
Nagel, 2002 and Riechmann and Weimann, 2004) improves coordination in the direction of 
the payoff-dominant equilibrium.
4 
In the present paper, we report on laboratory experiments with a rather continuous 
version of the minimum effort game featuring 51 symmetric Pareto-ranked equilibria in all 
                                      
2 The minimum effort game goes back to Bryant (1983), Cooper and John (1988) and Bryant (1996). Hirshleifer 
(1983) developed a similar game with a public goods story (see also Harrison and Hirshleifer, 1989). Both 
games are akin to the Stag Hunt game which can be traced back to Rousseau (1973[1755]). 
3 Cachon and Camerer (1996) who replicated Huyck et al (1990, 1991) reach the payoff-dominant solution in the 
median game with an outside option. Broseta, Fatas and Neugebauer (2003) extend the setting of van Huyck et 
al (1993) to public goods games with provision points-cum auction. The experimental results are comparable as 
to the convergence to the payoff-dominant equilibrium. However, in van Huyck et al dynamics come to rest 
there whereas in Broseta et al they do not.  
4 Comparable results were reported from experiments with other coordination games (see Brandts and Holt, 
1992, 1993).   
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treatments. We examine the effects of a money-back guarantee and the effects of within-
team competition. In a recent paper, Fatas and Neugebauer (2004) reported on within-team 
competition in the voluntary contribution mechanism. The voluntary contribution 
mechanism-cum within-team competition shares the same equilibrium structure with the 
three treatments considered in the present paper. Fatas and Neugebauer found convergence 
to and coordination on the Pareto efficient treatment in all but one observation. The analysis 
of within-team competition incentives seems particularly appealing to the minimum effort 
game. 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section, 2, discusses the theoretical 
benchmark and the implications of a minimum incentive system on the game structure and 
solutions. In section 3, we report the experimental procedures and results and section 4 
concludes, finally. 
 
2 The Experiment 
2.1 The minimum effort game (MEG) 
In our experiments we consider a version of Bryant’s (1983) minimum coordination game 
(hereafter MEG). Similar issues play an important role in other areas of economics, as team 
production (van Huyck et al., 1990 and Riechman and Weimann, 2004):
5 Four team members 
simultaneously and privately make their decision on how much effort ei ∈[0,50], i = {1, 2, 3, 
4}, to contribute to a team product. The team product is produced according to a Leontief 
production technology. The minimum effort contributed to the team product determines the 
output of the team, all effort exerted in excess of the minimum effort is lost. The output of 
the team and the units of effort exerted define a subject’s payoff. Let e = min {e1, e2, e3, e4} be 
the smallest order statistic of effort, the formal definition of individual i’s payoff is given in 
equation (1). 
 
πi (ei, e) = 50 + 2 e  - ei        ( M E G )  
 
                                      
5 Other stories include meeting at the restaurant and start eating not before the last group member has arrived; 
submitting chapters for a book and publishing the book when the last chapter has been received (Knez and 
Camerer, 1997); individual construction of a dike on the flat island Antarctica in which all inhabitants own pie 
slices of land and the flood enters where the dike is lowest (Hirshleifer, 1983).   
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The strategic problem of player i is thus the trade off between the opportunity costs arising 
from exerting too little effort and the costs of wasted effort from exerting more than the 
minimum within the team. Each symmetric strategy profile, i.e., each allocation in which 
every subject exerts the same effort, constitutes a Nash equilibrium. The payoff in a Nash 
equilibrium is the same to all subjects and increases linearly in the minimum effort, πi = 50 
+ e. Hence, the equilibria are Pareto-ranked, and the payoff-dominant strategy for all 
subjects would be to exert maximum effort, i.e., e = e1 = e2 = e3 = e4 = 50. 
 
 
2.2 Money back guarantee (MBG) 
One variation of the minimum effort game, considered also in van Huyck et al. (1990), is to 
take away the strategic uncertainty of wasted effort. This treatment decreases strategic 
uncertainty of subjects to zero, since the best response in all equilibria but the payoff-
dominant one is not unique anymore. The strategic problem thus reduces to exerting at least 
as much effort as the other team members. The individual payoff function is formally 
presented in equation (2). 
 
πi (ei, e) = 50 + 2 e  - ei  + (ei – e)     (MBG) 
              = 50 + e  
 
This secure game (hereafter MBG) compares to money back guarantees common in the 
literature on public goods with provision points (Isaac, Schmitz and Walker, 1988, Bagnoli 
and McKee, 1991, Marks and Croson, 1998, Croson and Marks, 1999 and 2000). In the game, 
the payoff-dominant equilibrium strategy dominates weakly all other strategies. Hence, 
coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium should be most frequent. Thus, this 
treatment is thought of as a benchmark of maximal achievable coordination without 
communication. 
 
2.3 Within-team competition (WTC) 
The within-team competition treatment (hereafter WTC) builds on earlier work of Fatas and 
Neugebauer (2004) and adds more strategic uncertainty to the minimum game. Subjects’ 
trade off between contributing too little and too much gets another dimension induced by  
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competition. Subjects who contribute too little are excluded from the team product. The 
payoff function is presented formally in equation (3). 
     5 0   +   2   e   - ei ,  if ei> e 
πi (ei, e) =  50 + e    if ei = e ∀i     (WTC) 
     5 0   -     e       if ei=e and ∃ej > e, i≠j 
 
The first line in equation (WTC) corresponds to equation (MEG). Subjects who exert more 
than minimum effort receive the same payoff as in the MEG. In any symmetric strategy 
profile the same payoffs apply in all three treatments as can be read from the second line. 
The within-team competition feature arises due to the last line in equation (WTC), 
according to which no subject receives any payoff from the team product if effort induces the 
minimum within the team. Thus, the contribution of the minimum is not always a secure 
strategy as it is in the MEG. 
  In this context, it might be worthwhile to allude to the between team competition 
settings of Bornstein et al (2002) and Riechmann and Weimann (2004). In both studies two 
teams played the minimum game simultaneously and the team with the greater team 
product won the competition. In Bornstein et al, the winner team received the same payoff it 
would have received without competition and the loser team received nothing. In Riechman 
and Weimann, both teams received the non-competition payoff and the winner received a 
fixed bonus payment. Both studies report greater coordination due to competition. 
However, Riechmann and Weimann (2004) report even more exerted effort in a pre-play 
communication treatment. 
 
2.4 General theory of equilibrium selection 
We discuss briefly the theoretical implications of the general theory of equilibrium selection 
by Harsanyi and Selten (1988) with respect to the experimental treatments. All equilibria of 
the considered games are pure strategy, symmetric equilibria and can be Pareto-ranked from 
zero effort to full effort. Therefore, Harsanyi and Selten’s theory would suggest the selection 
of the unique payoff-dominant equilibrium, in which full effort is exerted. Nevertheless, as 
already reported by van Huyck et al (1990), the payoff-dominant equilibrium is rarely 
observed in laboratory studies of the minimum effort coordination game. Harsanyi and 
Selten pose risk-dominance as an alternative equilibrium selection concept. We compute in  
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the appendix the risk-dominant equilibria for all games. We find that there is no risk-
dominant equilibrium in MEG,
6 in MBG there is a unique risk-dominant equilibrium which 
coincides with the payoff-dominant one. Finally, in WTC we find that the payoff-dominant 
equilibrium strategy risk-dominates all positive effort levels. However, the zero effort level is 
not risk-dominated by any equilibrium. In other words, in the WTC it is secure to exert no 
effort at all, but as soon as one contributes any positive amount to the team product it is 
more secure to contribute a greater amount. 
 
2.5 Experimental procedures 
In this paper we report the results of six computerized experimental sessions conducted at 
the experimental laboratory of the University of Valencia (LINEEX). The experiment, in 
which a total of 72 economics undergraduates participated, applied between-subject 
variation. Subjects were inexperienced, i.e., they had not participated in a similar experiment 
before. 
Each experimental treatment involved 24 economics undergraduates, organized into 
groups of four from a room of twelve following a partners random matching procedure. 
Average earnings of a subject were aperiod €16. Experiments took less than an hour to run. 
Before the experiment, written instructions were read, subjects filled out a 
questionnaire to check that all were able to calculate the payoff. Instructions and 
questionnaire were repeated until all subjects had answered the questionnaire correctly. 
After the experiment we ran a survey, in which we asked subjects to phrase their strategies 
and personal characteristics. Questionnaire and instruction sheets are available upon 
request.  
The experimental sessions entailed ten periods (original game) with another ten-
period surprise restart game. The restart technique has been applied to public goods 
experimental settings (Andreoni, 1988 and Croson, 1996). Subjects received in each period an 
initial endowment of 50 Eurocent, which they had to allocate between a “public account” 
and a “private” one.  Subjects were randomly chosen to form groups of four in the first 
period and remained together throughout both the original and the restart game. Subjects 
were informed about the individual contributions of their group in increasing order of 
                                      
6 However, the recent literature on equilibrium selection with applications to the minimum effort game shows 
that the most inefficient equilibrium has the highest stochastic potential and represents an attractor to 
evolutionary dynamics (Crawford, 1991 and Goeree et al, 2002).   
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contribution after each repetition; individual contributions were not identified with their 
contributor. Additionally, subjects were informed about their own earnings both in total and 
subdivided by private and public accounts. 
 
3. Experimental Results 
3.1 Equilibrium selection 
Tables 1 to 3 display the individual effort exerted in every period of each treatment organized 
by group from maximum to minimum. All allocations in which subjects played a mutual 
best response are indicated by an asterisk. As the small number of asterisks reveal most 
outcomes involve non-equilibrium play. We observe no coordination on any equilibrium in 
the first periods of any treatment. The first equilibrium could be reached in period 5 of MBG 
5. In WTC, the first equilibrium was reached by period 6 in group 3 and in MEG 1 we 
observe a first occurrence of equilibrium by period 8. In MEG and in WTC, four groups 
reached an equilibrium allocation at some period of the experiment and in MBG only two 
groups manage to coordinate throughout the experiment. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
In all treatments the observed equilibrium selection involved only one distinct, non-
risk-dominated equilibrium per group. However, the equilibria reached in MEG were all 
Pareto-dominated: in MEG 1 and MEG 4 we observe an equilibrium effort of 10 and in MEG 
2 and MEG 3 the equilibrium allocations involve no effort at all. In fact, the equilibrium 
involving effort level 10 which we observe in two groups of MEG seems to be a focal point of 
the MEG game. The reached equilibria in MEG seem fragile as we observe no repeated play 
in two subsequent periods. In sum, all observations document coordination failure 
throughout in MEG. 
Coordination on an inefficient equilibrium, in particular the most inefficient one, was 
also observed in WTC 1 and WTC 6. However, in WTC and in MBG two groups reached the 
payoff-dominant equilibrium. In some groups of treatments WTC and MBG equilibria were 
repeatedly played over several periods. Although we observe more coordination on the least 
efficient equilibrium in WTC than in MBG, in which only strictly positive effort levels are  
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chosen, it seems remarkable that the payoff-dominant equilibrium is reached more 
frequently in WTC than in MBG. 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
We count 21 occurrences of the payoff-dominant equilibrium in WTC and 16 in MBG; 
in total, we count 32 equilibrium occurrences in WTC and 8 in MEG. Nonetheless, it must 
be taken into account that in the three groups MBG 3, MBG 4 and MBG 6 coordination on 
the payoff-dominant equilibrium failed only due to one subject. Nevertheless, it appears 
striking that coordination failures in MBG are so persistent. After all, an effort of 50 
dominates weakly all other effort levels. Below we find out, that adaptive dynamics worked 
against the equilibrium selection process. 
 
3.2 Minimum effort and average contribution 
In the bottom line of tables 1 to 3 we report the average minimum and the average 
contribution. Additionally, figures A to C of the appendix plot minimum effort and average 
contribution by period against each other for every group. According to our team production 
story, the minimum effort represents the team product (or half of it). The average 
contribution shows us how much more could have been produced if effort was a substitute 
and not a complement in the production technology. The difference between the minimum 
and the average measures the loss of social effort. In other words, the difference between the 
two numbers, the distance between the two curves respectively, shows how poor subjects 
coordinated their actions. 
To be more formal, the ratio between the average contribution (social effort) and the 
average minimum effort (social product), hereafter social effort-product ratio, reveals how 
many times the average team product could actually have been produced within a treatment 
under a linear technology. In the first period of both the original game and the restart game 
(starting at period 11) the social effort-product ratio is about two in all treatments. Hence, if 
subjects would have been matched according to the order of their exerted effort levels, 
production could have been about double as high. Figure 1 plots the social effort-product 
ratio over all periods of the original and of the restart game. A remarkable feature of these 
plots is that the ratios of all treatments look very similar during the periods of the restart  
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game and apparently converge to one. A ratio of one represents the allocations in which no 
loss of social effort occurs. 
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
3.3 Restart effect 
As suggested already by the trajectories in figure 1, the data exhibits a restart effect. This 
effect, reported from several public goods experiments (Andreoni, 1988 and Croson, 1996), 
involves a change of individual behavior upon restarting the experiment. Table 4 records 
how many subjects changed their effort levels from the last period of the original game 
(period 10) to the first period of the restart game (period 11). The first and second column of 
table 4 record the number of subjects who increased and decreased their effort, respectively, 
the third column records the number of subjects who did not change and the fourth column 
records the average change; relative numbers are given in parenthesis. Finally, the last 
column of table 4 reports the outcomes of a two tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test which 
rejects in all treatment the null hypothesis of no restart effect at 5% significance. The restart 
effect is positive in the treatments MEG and WTC and negative in treatment MBG. Hence, 
efforts of the first period of the restart game are adjusted to levels between those of the first 
and the last period of the original game. 
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
 
3.4 Adaptive dynamics 
The decrease of the social effort-product ratio indicates that differences between the 
individual effort and the group minimum declined over the periods in all treatments. In this 
section, we examine the adjustment dynamics in the experiment. Our analysis is similar to 
the one presented in Berninghaus and Erhard (1998) who refer to learning direction theory 
(Selten and Stoecker, 1986 and Selten and Buchta, 1999).
7 In fact, there are many learning 
models that would be interesting to apply to our data (see Camerer, 2003 for a survey), 
including Cason and Friedman (1999) quantitative learning direction theory and the 
                                      
7 Our results support the findings of Berninghaus and Erhard.  
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reinforcement learning model of Roth and Erev (1995). Roth (1995) suggests that a modified 
version of the reinforcement learning model inclusive “common learning”, i.e., subjects 
adjust as if they had played the most successful strategy in the population, provides a good 
fit of the data in van Huyck et al. (1990). However, in this paper we limit ourselves to 
surveying our data in light of adjustment dynamics.  
Table 5 summarizes how frequently subjects adjusted their contributions from one 
period to the next. In the rows of the table, the effort of a subject 0<eit<100 is categorized 
according to its rank within the group from minimum, third ranked and second ranked to 
the maximum effort. Additionally, the extreme effort levels of zero and 50 are recorded in 
separate rows, thus, taking account of the fact that changes from the extremes can only 
occur into one direction. The columns organize the data according to subjects’ qualitative 
adjustments between periods from decrease of effort, and no change of effort, to increased 
effort. A decrease of effort means that a subject exerts less effort in a certain period than he 
did in the preceding one, an increase designates a greater effort in than in the previous 
period. 
In the last column of table 5, we report the probability values that result from a two-
tailed randomization test, in which we compare the importance of individual adjustments in 
both directions.
8 The test was run on the independent observations we computed for the six 
groups of a treatment. It should be pointed out that if the most extreme case occurred, and 
all observations had the same sign, the probability value will be no smaller than 3.1% as for 
instance in case of the minimum in MEG. Therefore, we apply a significance level of 10%. 
The sign below the p-value indicates the tendency of adjustments; a positive sign indicates 
increases were more important than decreases, and vice versa.  
 
 
[Table 5 around here] 
 
The displayed overall tendency indicates decreasing effort for treatments MEG and 
WTC and increasing effort for MBG. In WTC the indicated overall direction is insignificant 
whereas in MEG and in MBG overall directions were significant. In all treatments we find 
that subjects who exerted the minimum effort within their group in one period increased 
                                      
8 More accurately, we counted for each group and each condition (i.e., minimum etc.) the observations of 
upward and downward adjustments and computed the differences between them.   
Fatas Neugebauer Perote 2004      12
their effort in the following one. In MEG, subjects who did not exert the minimum effort 
within their group decreased their effort in the following period. A similar figure is presented 
by the tendency signs for the WTC, but decreases in the WTC are only significant for 
subjects who exerted a maximum effort within their group. The downward adjustments by 
2
nd and 3
rd ranked subjects were less pronounced in WTC than in MEG, because subjects in 
WTC faced the risk of exclusion from the team product payment in case they exerted the 
minimum effort within the group. Yet, the downward adjustments of subjects whose effort 
was 3
rd ranked in the WTC contrasts with the significant upward adjustments of the 3
rd 
ranked effort levels in the within-team competition treatment in Fatas and Neugebauer 
(2004). Fatas and Neugebauer introduced within-team competition in a voluntary 
contribution mechanism. The result was strikingly different from the one reported in the 
present study. Dynamics in Fatas and Neugebauer converged quickly to the payoff-
dominant equilibrium. The opposed dynamics of subjects whose effort was 3
rd ranked 
affected most likely the contrary outcome in the present study.  
  Behavioral adjustments also seem to have influenced the equilibrium selection in 
MBG. Upward tendencies were only significant for the minimum, and 70 observations 
induce decreasing effort between periods, including 23 subjects who exerted maximum 
effort within their group. Why these adjustments occur is not clear. 
 
4. Conclusions 
In the present paper, we have reported an experiment on a continuous version of the 
minimum effort game. We examined the effects of within-team competition vs. a standard 
minimum effort game and a secure treatment where the payoff-dominant equilibrium 
weakly dominates all other actions. We find that within-team competition help experimental 
subjects to coordinate on playing a symmetric equilibrium in the minimum effort 
coordination game. More strikingly, subjects coordinate even more frequently on the payoff-
dominant equilibrium than in our secure treatment. Nonetheless, within-team competition 
seems to polarize behavior to the extreme equilibria of the minimum effort game. This 
stands in sharp contrast to the behavior observed in the voluntary contribution mechanism-
cum within-team competition by Fatas and Neugebauer (2004). The behavioral differences 
to Fatas and Neugebauer seem to be a consequence of the adaptive dynamics. 
Our data exhibits a restart effect, as it has been reported from several public goods 
experiments (Andreoni, 1988 and Croson, 1996). In line with Brandts and Cooper (2004), and  
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contrary to the “bell ringing effect” described in Crawford’s (1991) discussion of Van Huyck, 
Battalio, and Beil’s (1991) work, the restart does not always act as a coordinating device, as it 
is positive in both our baseline and within-team competition treatments, but negative in the 
secure treatment. So it seems that these results don’t necessarily extend to this environment.  
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Appendix A: Theoretical propositions 
Proposition – Risk-dominance (Minimum Effort Game) 
In the MEG no risk-dominant equilibrium exists. 
 
To examine the risk-dominance structure of the MEG, we consider two arbitrary equilibria. 
The two symmetric equilibria are represented by the effort levels A and B, A>B. We 
compute the Nash products of losses accruing to the players by deviating unilaterally from 
the equilibrium strategy. The greater Nash product indicates the risk-dominant equilibrium.  
 
According to the equation (MEG) the following matrix displays the payoffs at effort levels A 
and B. 
    Player 2, 3, 4 
  A  B 
Player 1  A  2A+50-A  50-A+2B 
 B  50+B  50+B 
A∈(B,50]; B∈[0,A) 
By deviating from the equilibrium strategy A and playing B, player 1 makes the following 
loss.  
d(B, A, A, A)= 2A+50-A – (50+B) = A – B 
By deviating from the equilibrium strategy A and playing B, player 1 makes the following 
loss.  
d(A,B,B,B) = 50+B – (50 -A+2B) = A – B 





which implies that no risk-dominant equilibrium exists.  
 
Proposition – Risk-dominance (Money Back Guarantee) 
In the MBG, the payoff-dominant equilibrium is the unique risk-dominant equilibrium. 
    Player 2, 3, 4 
  A  B 
Player 1  A  50+A  50+B 
 B  50+B  50+B 
A∈(B,50]; B∈[0,A) 
Deviation from (A,A,A,A): d(B, A, A, A)= 50+A – (50+B) = A – B  
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Deviation from (B,B,B,B): d(A,B,B,B) = 50+B – (50 – B) = 0 
Comparison of Nash products: d(A,B,B,B)
4 < d(B,A,A,A)
4  
It follows that (50,50,50,50) is the unique risk-dominant equilibrium. 
 
Proposition – Risk-dominance (Within-team Competition) 
In the WTC, the payoff-dominant equilibrium risk-dominates all equilibria with positive 
effort levels, but it does not dominate the zero effort equilibrium. 
    Player 2, 3, 4 
  A  B 
Player 1  A  2A+50-A  50-A+2B 
 B  50-B 50+B 
A∈(B,50]; B∈[0,A) 
Deviation from (A,A,A,A): d(B, A, A, A)= 50+A – (50-B) = A + B  
Deviation from (B,B,B,B): d(A,B,B,B) = 50+B – (50-A+2B) = A-B 
Comparison of Nash products:   d(A,B,B,B)
4 < d(B,A,A,A)
4 if B>0 
     d(A,0,0,0)
N = d(0,A,A,A)
N 
It follows that (50,50,50,50) is risk-dominant and that (0,0,0,0) is not dominated in risk.   
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Appendix B: Figures and Tables 
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Table 1. Effort – MEG 
             P E R I O D           
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15  16  17  18  19 20
MEG  1  Max  35 35 20 20 30 20 18 10 15 25 20 12 20 15 12 15 10 15 12 10
    20 20 15 15 17 15 15 10 10 12 16 10 13 12 8 10 10 10 10 8
    14 20 15 13 16 13 14 10 9 5 15 10 12 10 8  7  8  9 10 7
  Min  10 12 14 12 12 10 10 10 6 5 10 10 10 6 7  5  7  8  8 6
            *            
MEG  2  Max  20 25  15 5 10 10 10 15 8 6 30 20 10 5 5 1 5 5 0 0
    20 10  10 5 10 5 5 5 5 5 10 10 5 5 5 0 2 0 0 0
    1 0 1 0   1 0  5  55555555252  0  0  0  00
  M i n   55  5  0  20535410000  0  0  0  00
                       * *
MEG  3  Max  50 25  10  5 2 2 2 1 1 0 25 13 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
    25 20  7 1 1 2 2 1 1 0 25 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    25 15 6 1 1 2 2 1 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
  M i n   2 0 5  1  1  11100000000  0  0  0  00
              *   *   *       *
MEG  4  Max  50 33 17 15 12 13 10 15 10 10 30 20 15 15 15 15 13 10 15 13
    25 25 15 15 12 10 5 10 10 10 25 15 15 15 15 13 10 10 13 12
    19 20 10 13 12 10 5 7 7 9 25 10 15 15 13 10 10 10 12 10
  Min  15 4 10  10 5 2 5 5 5 6 10 10 10 10 10  10 8 10  10 8
                      *     
MEG  5  Max  40 45 30 50 10 10 10 12 25 30 25 20 20 20 20 16 18 18 16 20
    35 30 25 25 5 5 10 10 25 25 20 20 20 16 16 15 18 16 15 15
    15 20 6  5  1 0 5 10 15 20 13 15 15 12 15 15 15 15 15 15
  Min  10 5 5 2 0 0 2 10 15 10 10 12 14 10 7  12  10  10  10 10
                        
MEG  6  Max  15 40 30 20 14 30 15 33 17 20 35 22 20 16 20 20 20 19 19 20
    10 10 29 15 12 16 14 15 15 15 13 15 17 16 20 19 19 19 19 18
    10 8  10 13 10 12 10 10 10 15 10 14 15 16 18 18 19 18 18 16
  Min  4 7  10  1  5 8 6 8 10 13 10 13 14 15 17 18 18 18 17 12
                        
A v g .   m i n i m u m   1 16  8  4  44567678877  8  7  8  86
Avg.  contribution  21 19  14  11 9 8 8 9 10 10 17 12 11 10 10 9 9 9 9 8
* denotes mutual best response  
Fatas Neugebauer Perote 2004      21
Table 2. Effort – MBG 
             P E R I O D           
    1  2  3  4  5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
MBG  1  Max  25 30 25 33 35 39 40 42 45 45 35 30 35 39 25 38 39 39 41 49
    20 18 25 28 35 38 40 41 44 45 30 22 27 35 25 30 35 38 40 45
    20 12 15 23 19 33 30 39 40 37 12 15 15 21 25 22 34 37 40 45
  Min  4  10 11 15 19 25 27 35 20 35 5 10 10 18 14 19 30 32 39 41
                         
MBG  2  Max  50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
    30 30 49 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 46 45 45 50 50 50 50 50 50
    11  12 40 49 48 12 48 46 50 48 46 45 45 45 45 50 49 48 50 50
  Min  1  1  11 11 11 10 40 45 44 45 10 15 40 45 45 46 47 48 49 50
                         *
MBG  3  Max  50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
    50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
    10 20 15 12 45 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
  Min  10 5  8  5  10 10 15 17 20 20 10 12 15 17 20 22 25 27 30 32
                         
MBG  4  Max  50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
    30 50 50 50 50 40 45 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
    28 40 46 49 50 39 38 40 41 40 45 35 38 50 47 49 45 50 39 40
  Min  22 14 36 39 24 39 20 38 40 35 9 27 26 27 41 32 39 40 39 39
                         
MBG  5  Max  50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
    40 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
    25 45 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
  Min  20 40 35 40 50 50 45 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
            **   ********  *  *  *  **
MBG  6  Max  45 40 39 35 38 43 45 47 45 46 45 40 43 45 43 45 47 50 50 50
    40 37 35 33 30 35 40 45 45 45 45 40 42 43 42 45 46 47 50 50
    35 30 30 29 30 35 37 40 40 43 40 40 40 40 40 42 45 46 48 50
  Min  20 30 30 25 29 33 36 35 38 40 28 35 37 35 39 40 43 45 46 46
                         
Avg.  minimum  12,8 17 22 23 24 28 31 37 35 38 19 25 30 32 35 35 39 40 42 43
Avg. 
contribution  28,6 32 35 37 38 39 42 44 44 45 38 38 40 42 42 43 45 46 46 47
* denotes mutual best response  
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Table 3. Effort – WTC 
             P E R I O D           
    1  2 3  4  5  6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
WTC 
1 Max  45  38 15  40  10  26 11 10 12 2 30 25 11 7 3  0  10  7  3 0
    35  20 4 7  7  4 5 3 7 1 25 11 10 1 2 0 3 5 1 0
    33  10 2 3  4  2 1  1  2 0 15 5 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
  Min  1 4 1 2  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
                        *         *
WTC 
2  Max  29 30 30 31  24  8 4 5 6 4 15 17 20 15 17 15 15 15 15 10
    27 30 20 25  5  0 4 4 5 4 15 16 20 15 13 15 12 14 1 2
    25 15 12 15  0  0 1  2 4 0 10 15 17 12 12 8 10  14 0 0
 Min  0  5 11  0  0  0 0 2 0 0 6 8 0 5 0  0  10  0  0 0
                                 
WTC 
3  Max  35 50 50 50  50  50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
    30 35 50 50  50  50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
    20 30 40 40  50  50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
  Min  15 25 35 40  45  50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 20
              * * * * ******  *  *  *  *  
WTC 
4  Max  50 50 50 50  30  40 50 1  5 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
    49 50 50 30  30  20 0 0 0 0 40 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
    40 50 50 15  0  10 0 0 0 0 20 40 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
  Min  17  15 10  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 10 25 40 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
                    * *  *  *  *  * *
WTC 
5  Max  40 45 50 40  30  45 50 12 5 6 50 38 40 46 50 50 50 30 15 16
    36 40 45 35  8  2 15 1  4 2 46 36 38 41 50 50 44 3  0 8
    35  35 40 5  0  0 15 0 0 0 35 10 36 40 47  42  0 0 0 0
  Min  17 0 0 1  0  0 0 0 0 0 1 10 30 40 0 0 0 0 0 0
                                 
WTC 
6  Max  50 50 50 50 50 50 50 25 10 50 40 0 0 0 0  0  0  0  0 0
    50  50 45  10 40  40 50 0 0 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    40  40 40 0  0 25 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
  Min  30 0 40 0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
                * * * *  *  *  *  * *
Avg. minimum  13 8,2 16 7,2 7,5 8,3 8,3 8,7 8,3 8,3 11 16 20 24 17 17 18 17 17 12
Avg. contribution  31 30 31 22  18  20 20 11 11 15 25 23 26 26 25 24 23 20 18 17
* denotes mutual best response  
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Table 4. Restart effect: individual changes between round 10 and 11 




 (relative)  (relative)  (relative)  (relative)  (p-value) 
MEG 15 5  4 6.38  -2.627
** 
 (.625)  (.208)  (.167)  (.61)  .009 
MBG 2  11 11  -6.84  -2.380
* 
 (.083)  (.458)  (.458)  (-.15)  .017 
WTC 13 3  8 10.17  -2.509
* 
 (.542)  (.125)  (.333)  (.67)  .012 
a)  Two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test, N =24. Z-value asympt. standard norm. 
distributed.  
** *Significant at 1%,
** significant at 5%. 
  
Fatas Neugebauer Perote 2004      24
Table 5. Individual adjustments in period t 
a) 
   # decrease # unchanged # increase Column total  p-value b) 
Treatment Effort  in  t-1 (relative) (relative)  (relative) (relative)  Tendency 
MEG 0  -  23  31  54  . 
     (.780)  (.220)  (.116)   
 Minimum  13  26  75  114  .031** 
   (.114)  (.228)  (.658)  (.264)  + 
 Third  55  31  24  110  .063* 
   (.500)  (.282)  (.218)  (.255)  – 
 Second  48  18  15  81  .031** 
   (.593)  (.222)  (.185)  (.188)  – 
 Maximum  61  3  10  74  .031** 
   (.824)  (.041)  (.135)  (.171)  – 
 50  3  0  -  3  . 
   (1.00)      (.007)   
 Row total  180  117  135  432  .094* 
   (.417)  (.271)  (.313)  (1.00)  – 
MBG 0  -  0  0  0  . 
         (.000)   
 Minimum  12  10  83  105  .031** 
   (.114)  (.095)  (.790)  (.243)  + 
 Third  24  9  40  73  .500 
   (.329)  (.123)  (.548)  (.169)  + 
 Second  11  4  28  43  .125 
   (.256)  (.093)  (.651)  (.100)  + 
 Maximum  14  1  11  26  1.00   
   (.538)  (.038)  (.423)  (.006)  – 
 50  9  176  -  185  . 
   (.049)  (.951)    (.428)   
 Row total  70  200  162  432  .031** 
   (.162)  (.463)  (.375)  (1.00)  + 
WTC 0  -  81  36  117  . 
     (.692)  (.308)  (.271)   
 Minimum  5  1  30  36  .063* 
   (.139)  (.028)  (.833)  (.083)  + 
 Third  24  6  19  49  .563 
   (.490)  (.122)  (.388)  (.113)  – 
  Second 35 10 20 65 .438 
   (.538)  (.154)  (.308)  (.150)  – 
 Maximum  38  3  7  48  .094* 
   (.792)  (.063)  (.146)  (.111)  – 
 50  20  97  -  117  . 
   (.171)  (.829)    (.271)   
 Row total  122  198  112  432  .469 
   (.282)  (.458)  (.259)  (1.00)  – 
a)  Absolute frequencies of changes from round t-1 to round t, relative numbers in 
parenthesis, t ={2, 3,..,10, 12, 13,..,20}. b) Exact probability value of a two-tailed randomization 
test, N=6. ** Significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.  
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